it suffices to juxtapose the article 96 (which guarantees legal equality and announces the abolition of hereditary and class privileges and titles) the article 104 (which gives everyone the right to express freely their opinion) and the article 111 (which states that all citizens are guaranteed the freedom of conscience and religious practice) with the article 114 under which the Catholic Church was granted a leading position among formally equal denominations on the ground that it represented a religion of the vast majority of the nation. Provisions included in the articles 109-116 concerning the right to form public organizations could and were used against national minorities. The provisions in question enabled the State to exercise control over various associations and interfere in people`s life each time social order and good mores were claimed to be disturbed. Furthermore, the Catholic Church was not subject to the supervision of the State administration. The activity of the Catholic Church was regulated by the treaty concluded with the Holy See (in practice, after the ratification of the concordat by the Polish Parliament, the State willingly gave up any form of interference in the Church activity -except for those cases where Catholic priests were suspected of breaching the regulations of the Civil Code) 4 . The legal order created by the March Constitution met with a disapproval from the Piłsudski`s adherents (and the Marshall himself) who managed to seize power by carrying out successful coup d`etat in May 1926. Most ideas which underlay the Constitution of 1921 (including regulations concerning the rights and duties of the ethnic minorities) clashed with political conceptions of the new rulers of Poland. The latter were especially opposed to elevating the concept of nation to the status of a crucial political value. The representatives of the Piłsudski`s camp believed that overemphasizing the significance of the concept of nation led to the diminishing of the authority of the State which was given an all-important place in the structure of political conceptions they had developed. With the idea of the State put at the head of their ideological arrangements, the concept of nation sank into a level of secondary importance. By the same token they denied the need for "national consolidation" and stressed the necessity of building a strong state capable of coping with all the problems that might appear because of ethnic differences. Such an approach was later mirrored in the regulations included in the Constitution of 1935. In the first article of the Constitution the Polish State was described as a common good of all citizens 5 . With the State assumed to be a common good, the authors of the Constitution saw no need to tackle -at least at the constitutional level -the problem of the ethnic minorities.
As for the inter-war period, minority policy can be said to have engrained in the hope for assimilating the aspirations of national minorities into the idea of "modern nation building" (which was contradictory) or (after 1926) "modern state building" 6 . As a matter 12 A. Adamczyk, K. Kaźmierczak of fact, it was only a circle of the adherents of Marshal Józef Piłsudski and -it needs to be added, in the period limited to the years 1918-1921 -that took into consideration the eventuality of the Polish assistance in the process of forming separate national states satisfying ambitions of those non-Polish nations that had once inhabited the prepartitioned Poland. The conclusion of the treaty of Riga (21 III 1921) putting an end to a war between the Soviet Russia and Poland marked the abandoning of all the plans for creating political organisms separating Poland from the Soviet State, which in turn meant that Poland had been left with no other option but to incorporate territories where the Poles were in the minority. The final delineation of the Polish borders along the lines of 1921 ( which were recognized by an international community in 1923) necessitated the recognition of one-third of the non-Polish population as Polish citizens. The Polish elites were quite aware that such a development was likely to result in the representatives of national minorities oscillating between loyalty, indifference, and hostility to the Polish State.
The Ukrainians were a group that caused most problems for the Polish administration. Separatist tendencies were the strongest among them and they took the lead in the acts of violence directed against both the representatives of the Polish elites as well as against ordinary Poles. The fact that Poland failed to meet the obligations incurred during the Polish-Soviet war was used by the Ukrainians as a pretext for anti-government action. Cultural autonomy, the freedom of speech or political rights did not suffice to satisfy their ambitions and discourage them from carrying out violent acts 7 . The extremist actions such as the assassinations of the Vice-Chairman of the Polish parliament Tadeusz Hołówko ( 1931) and Minister of Internal Affairs Bolesław Pieracki (1934) or the assaults on the villages situated near the Soviet border with the majority of the Polish population made it necessary for the government to react firmly. In response to the acts of terror the government decided to conduct military "pacification" of the eastern parts of Poland, which had the effect of significantly deteriorating the living conditions of the Ukrainians 8 .
Chojnowski Deputies to the Polish Parliament and about hundred of the most active and harmful Ukrainian activists. The youth organization "Płast" controlled entirely by the terrorists was disbanded. These steps were followed by the shutting down of the three Ukrainian secondary schools in Rohatyn, Drohobycz and Tarnopol. The police restricted their actions to searching houses for weapons or for some links likely to help in detecting illegal organizations usually based in public reading rooms or cooperatives of various kind. The latter were usually run by young and educated abroad members of Political terrorism of the latter also led the authorities to set up a seclusion camp in Bereza Kartuska which was later made use of by the ruling camp for combating political opponents of every hue 9 . The difficulties caused by the Jewish population were of a different nature and can be put down to two factors: 1) a reluctance to integrate into the whole society 2) high natural growth of the Jews 10 . Contrary to what is generally assumed, the Jews living in Poland were far from being as well-off as their brothers from Western Europe or from the US. Hence, the increase in the Jewish population, combined with a tendency to isolate oneself from the rest of the society, was a fact that contributed to the expansion of the areas of poverty in the Polish Republic, fostering conflicts between the Jews and the Poles. And with the Jewish elites reacting only half-heartedly to some Polish friendly gestures 11 , the approval of a policy calculated to make the Jews integrate and live on a peaceful basis with the Poles was gradually giving way to a conviction that it was better-advised to help the program of the Jewish emigration 12 . The Byelorussian minority occupied the least place in the Polish politics. The reason for this was a low national self-awareness of the Bielorussians themselves -the fact of which the Polish authorities were clearly aware 13 . It was believed that this group was secret societies. If in carrying out their operations the police was disturbed in any way, then a more painful search was administered, which consisted in putting salt in sugar or spilling oil over flour in the shops. In doing this the police only copied the methods employed by the Ukrainians. The policemen resorted to beating only when resisted with the use of force. After September the 16 th , the troops intervened only to prevent the Ukrainians from carrying out the acts of violence. At the request of a governor, military authorities sent in the cavalry to a disturbed region. For a few days up to a few weeks, the population was required to billet soldiers and provide hay and clover for horses. This duty was usually accompanied by bothersome police searches. highly unlikely to become the source of any serious problems 14 . The same, however, cannot be said of the German question a special complexity of which resulted from the necessity of meeting the obligations incurred by Poland right after the regaining of an independent State. b) International environment and the policy towards minorities All the problems which the Polish authorities had with the German minority did not stem simply from the fact that there was a great number of Germans resident in the Polish Republic. Not only were they thought of as a creative and useful element but they were also considered to be generally loyal to the Polish State 15 . The core of the problem lay in the instrumental use of the minority question by the Weimar Republic and later by the Third Reich. The so-called small treaty of Versailles gave Germany the right to interfere in the internal affairs of Poland if these pertained to minority situation 16 . With the Polish Foreign Minister Józef Beck denouncing the treaty (13 IX 1934) , this meddling was brought to an end. By this act the western neighbor of Poland was given to understand that Poland put a free hand in shaping its minority policy ahead of a long diplomatic haggling aimed at securing some concession to Poles staying abroad 17 . The refusal to honor the treaty just mentioned was also a clear signal to others; for it needs to be said that not only did the politicians of the Weimar Republic aid and abet the German minority in the acts directed against the Polish authorities but they also egged the Ukrainians on to follow suit.
In formulating its minority policy the Polish government was forced to take into consideration the plans and intentions of the Eastern neighbor of Poland. Taking advantage of the Communist cells existing in Poland the Soviet government tried to destabilize the internal situation in the Polish Republic by instigating the Ukrainians, Byelorussians and the Jews to carry out anti-Polish acts. The Poles considered the threat posed by the Soviets to be more harmful than the one posed by the Germans 18 .
14 Stenograficzne sprawozdanie 12 posiedzenia Sejmu RP (9 II 1931) 18 The reverse situation should also be mentioned. The Polish policy towards the Soviet Union also involved the so-called Promethean program which was to consist in the attempts to detach from the Soviet Union its national minorities and help them build their own states. This idea was designed to weaken the Russian influence in the Baltic area, central Asia, the Caucasus, and to form a buffer zone separating Poland from the Soviet Union. W. The minority problem was inherently bound up with two political conceptions that emerged at the dawn of an independence and contained different visions of what territorial shape the resurgent Poland should take on. The fundamental issue that had to be addressed by the authors of both conceptions was that of the security of the reborn Poland -both internal and external. The so-called incorporation program created by the leader of the Polish nationalists, Roman Dmowski, endorsed the idea of building an ethnically homogenous Polish State. As far as territorial issues were concerned, the Polish nationalists called for incorporating all the territories in which Poles constituted the majority of the whole population -plus some areas to which Poland could lay claims invoking the so-called historical rights. Leaving outside Poland the areas where Poles were considerably outnumbered by the representatives of other nations was to guarantee the possibility of building a coherent state organism and rule out the necessity of struggling with the separatist movements in the future. A different view was held by the Piłsudski`s adherents supporting the federation program. In addition to the idea of creating small nation States federated with Poland -States which were supposed to form a bulwark separating Poland from the Soviet Russia, the proponents of this conception thought of achieving maximal objectives by planning to resuscitate the First Polish Republic ( that is the one that had ceased to exist following the partitions taking place in the latter half of the 18 century). It was obvious that the projected State which the adherents of the federation program wanted to create was of course to include ethnic minorities -the latter were even considered to be a desirable element in the reemerging Poland. In this conception Poland was to derive strength from its demographic potential regarded as a real asset in the possible conflict with one of the two aggressive neighbors 19 . The divisions between the supporters and the opponents of the idea of living on a peaceful basis with the ethnic minorities within one State crystallized in the period 1918-1921 prevailed until the mid-thirties. The rising tension in the international relations towards the end of the 30s made it of course necessary to pay some attention to the problem of the ethnic minorities but gave rise to no new phenomena 20 concerning minority question which would be worthy of separate analysis. 
Racja stanu Polski na Wschodzie (the Polish Reason of State in the East

THE PERIOD OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1939-1945
During the Second World War the problem of how to regain independence became again of crucial importance for all Poles. The problems concerning ethnic minorities had quite naturally moved to the margin of political considerations, which, however, does not mean that they stopped being dealt with altogether. During the war, minority problems were paid attention to in the context of the discussion of a more general question of how to organize social and political realm after the war had come to an end. The Polish leaders stressed the need to grant national minorities the right to develop their cultural activity and secure for them the freedom of religious practice provided the representatives of minority groups remained law-abiding citizens of the Polish State. The German minority, however, was excluded from this offer, which -considering atrocities committed by the Germans during the war -was hardly surprising. It was demanded that the Germans as bearing responsibility for the suffering of the Polish people, should be forced to leave Poland and their property should be confiscated. Despite the Holocaust, the future of the Jewish minority also became the object of the controversy. Some political circles wanted the Polish government to do its best to enable the Jews to emigrate. Most, however, opted for putting off the discussion of the problem till the restoration of an independent State 21 . A more detailed stance on the minority problem crystallized gradually following the successive announcements of the decisions arrived at during the conferences held in Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam. The representatives of the Great Powers decided that the German population would be compulsorily displaced from the areas to be incorporated to Poland. At the same time the Poles expected to settle the areas abandoned by the Germans were to be expelled from the Eastern provinces of the pre-war Poland ( this displacement was referred to as a "willing repatriation") -now, to be annexed by the Soviet Union. In taking the crucial decisions, the leaders of the Great Powers passed over in silence the non-Polish, mainly Ukrainian, minority living in the Polish East before the outbreak of the war. The Polish elites, however, could not ignore the fact that the Polish State had been robbed of more than half of its pre-war territory and that 3 million of its citizens had been put under the foreign jurisdiction. Even the changes in the sentiments of the national minorities 22 discerned during the war -often put down to a wrong-headed minority policy carried out in the inter-war period -could not account for and justify so heavy a blow which Poland suffered because of the decisions made by the Great Powers. The Poles, it might be added here, were convinced that mutual relations between the Poles and the 21 Such an approach was characteristic of the representatives of the pre-war ruling camp. They predicted that with the war over the Jews were likely to play an important and secret role in the peace negotiations. That is why they considered the espousal of the idea of equal rights for the Jews to be indispensable for tactical reasons. They stressed that ignoring this problem will not make it disappear from the Polish life but will be interpreted as an indication of the Polish hidden antiSemitism to which the Poles do not want to own up. Józef Piłsudski Instytute of London, col. Uchodźstwo, sygn. 36, dok. 25, k. 5. 22 On the one hand the Polish politicians indicated that a greater part of the Ukrainian elites remained loyal to Poland during the German invasion but on the other hand the Poles also pointed out that the Ukrainians attacked the Polish population -especially in the district of Wołyń. These acts were accounted for by the abetting influence of the Germans and by the activity of the "Bolshevik fifth column".
Ukrainians were likely to be improved soon as it was in the interest of both nations to defend themselves against the "benefits" of the Soviet occupation 23 .
THE PERIOD OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND (PRL), 1945 -1989
At the time when Poland remained a satellite of the USSR the problem of national minorities did not bother the communist authorities in any particular manner. The effects of social-mechanisms that were decided in Yalta and Potsdam caused Poland, existing within the post 1945 borders, to become a mono-ethnic state. The factors that determined it were as follows: 1/ the Nazi Holocaust which nearly occasioned the total physical annihilation of the Polish Jews community; 2/ displacement of the Germans from the lands granted to Poland, likewise from the territory of Hungary and Czechoslovakia 24 ; 3/ the lack of choice of a "new mother country" among Ukrainian, Byelorussians, and Lithuanian people, and automatic ascription of Soviet nationality to the former citizens of the Republic of Poland those of Slavic but non-Polish descent; 4/ settlement of the expelled Poles from behind the eastern border into the so-called "Recovered Territories". However, it did not mean that the communist leaders did not try to solve the nationality issues instrumentally. During the so-called "Vistula Action" 25 the PRL government dislocated about 150 000 thousands of Ukrainians, Lemkos and Boykos, inhabiting the Polish-Slovak borders in the Beskid Niski range, into western and northern regions of Poland. It is a fact that the Polish authorities did not hesitate to use anti-Semitic slogans to disentangle the significant social problems 26 , consequently generating the exodus of Polish citizens of Jewish descent 27 . As will be argued below the basis for the conclusions on the transformations occurring in the Poland's demographic profile (especially for the comparative research in comparison with the interwar period) is provided through the use of the statistical data, particularly information obtained from the census reports. Since the end of World War II seven censuses were conducted by the Central Statistical Office in Poland 28 . The National Censuses that were carried out during the years 1950-1988 did not take into consideration the questions of nationality and language 29 and hence their value still remains a matter of discussion. 23 It is generally accepted that in the post-war period the creation of harmonious development on behalf of national minorities did not constitute a major interest of the communist authorities. Nevertheless, they attempted to construct the image of themselves as being the protectors of the rights of national and ethnic minority inhabitants. 30 More importantly, however, the strengthening of Polish state in respect of national homogeneity was one of the chief postulates of the Government of the Polish People's Republic. 31 Practically, the communist interests in national minorities were limited to the issuance of permits and reglamentation of the privileges that allow those specified groups to cultivate their own separateness. Even in such cases the main motive of action was to confine strictly the indications of minorities's activity and to create the possibilities for supervising them and intervention should the occasion arise 32 . One has to be aware that the Polish elites of the post-war emigration were concerned with the minority issues in a broader sense as well. In their view it was the nationality question that constituted the essence of struggle for the sovereign Poland together with the regaining of territorial status quo ante bellum. Therefore, the Polish political emigrees demanding Poland's return to the former Riga border were forced to raise the issue of coexistence with the alien ethnic groups. Their main program's slogan was to reject all attempts reducing the nationality questions toward realization of the idea of Piast Poland, created to meet the demands of communist propaganda. This concept was interpreted only as a formula imposed by PRL authorities to justify the abandonment of claims to the Polish eastern lands. Nevertheless, the idea of Piast Poland was respectively balanced by another factor; namely the conception of Jagiellonian Poland. As far it was concerned, this idea framed as a tool for contending, questioned the alleged historical arguments addressed to the formation of Poland's national state 33 . Although the political circles in exile were thoroughly aware of the mistakes committed by the Polish people in the age of independence, they understood the truth that previously existing tensions and antagonisms 30 33 Émigré circles argued it was out of the question to state categorically that Poland throughout its thousand years of history was as a state an ethnically homogenous organism. What can be said, they claimed, is that from the 14 th century onwards Poland certainly was not a mono-ethnic state. What is more, no single part of Poland can be considered to have ever been nationally homogenous in the contemporary sense of the term. The Jagiellonian Poland comprising the Poles, the Lithuanians and the Ruthenians formed the same commonwealth as the United Kingdom comprising the Englishmen, the Scots and the Wales. The émigré authors indicated that even the partitions -that might be expected to lead to the destruction of all former bonds -failed to shatter cultural cohesiveness of multinational community which turned out to be stronger than the rising nationalisms and separatist tendencies. Rada narodowa czy państwowa (National or State Council), "Listy z Londynu" (Letters from London) No 6/80 (11 IV 1945) , pp. 4-5. were the result of inspiration directed toward the Polish statehood by her external enemies. Considering that fact the representatives of the Polish emigrant elites indicated that ethnic arguments turned out to be not a sufficient reason in regard to the so-called "Curzon Line". According to them removing the Polish people behind that demarcation line did not create a panacea for Poland's national malady 34 .
S. Mękarski, "Przykuci łańcuchem do jednej galery" ("Chained to a Single Galley"), "Dziennik Polski i Dziennik
THE PERIOD OF NEW INDEPENDENT POLAND, 1989-2009
The National Census, already conducted in the Third Republic of Poland, showed that the national and ethnic minority residents in Poland constituted 1.23% of the entire population for 471 500 have declared themselves as belonging to national status other than Polish. As for the remaining 2.03% (774 000) they did not define their national affiliation 35 . According to data provided by the Central Statistical Offices Poland is inhabited by the representatives of nine national minorities that include Belarusians, Czechs, Lithuanians, Germans, Armenians, Russians, Slovakians, Ukrainians and Jews. There are also four ethnic groups in Poland consisted of Karaites, Lemkos Roms and Tartars 36 . The political transformation in Poland in 1989 brought the essential reorientation of the Polish political system and also laid basis for implementation of fresh policy 37 with the new regulations toward national minorities and ethnic groups 38 . The most important documents regulating the legal status in this field comprise the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the Electoral Law, the Association Act, the Act on the Polish Language, the Education System Act, the Radio and Television Act, Penal Code, the Code of Administrative Proceeding, of Civil Proceeding, of Criminal Proceeding, Personal Data Protection Act and the Regulations by the Minister of National Education.
The legal status concerning the national and ethnic minority inhabitants in Poland was temporarily modified by the Small Constitution of 1992. The final law regulations on the constitutional level, especially the guarantees in the scale of preservation of own identity, was granted by the virtue of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 39 . The detailed questions in the sphere of national minorities' rights are secured by numerous acts, decrees, regulations and circulars issued by central and local governments.
It is worth mentioning that the national minorities in Poland possess guaranteed political rights including the prerogative to own representation in the Polish Parliament. Art. 134 Electoral committees made up of members of registered national minorities organizations may have their electoral lists exempted from the provision mentioned in section 1 of the article 133, if they notify the National Electoral Commission about their intention to do so not later than 5 days before the Election Day. Along with the notification, mentioned in the first sentence, the committee is required to present a document issued by the respective statutory body of the organization confirming the formation of the committee by the voters-members of this organization. The National Electoral Commission has to confirm without delay that it has received the notification mentioned in section 1. The confirmation is binding.
Art 135. If the condition prescribed in the article 133 section 1 is met by the candidate lists of no election committee or one of the conditions is met by the candidate lists of only one election committee, then it is the lists of only those election committees that have received at least 3% of the votes nationwide that are taken into consideration in allotting seats in Parliament. The candidate lists of election committees established by political coalitions will be taken into consideration in allotting seats in Parliament if they manage to get at least 5% of all votes. 41 In the current Parliament there is one representative of Byelarussian minority who was elected on the Left and Democrats ticket, one representative of German minority who won his seat on the German minority ticket and one representative of the Ukrainian minority who ran on the Civic Platform ticket. to a given minority. Another paragraph of the act permits the national minorities to use their own language as a mother tongue. Such possibility may be anticipated in the territory of "gmina" where the particular ethnic group exists. It should be stressed that the minority language assumes a form of auxiliary communication and plays a significant role in maintaining relations and contacts with the local governments and court authorities. The Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and the Act on the Polish Language grant permission to every national or ethnic minority resident to use native language in regard to the geographical nomenclature of Poland. The regulations are applied to physiographic objects, localities, authorities and likewise in case of street names. The statue also guarantees the minority rights to official recording of surnames and first names with application to the rules of native language. From the context of the Act, it is evident that the administrative bodies are obligated to support national and ethnic minority activities in the sphere of security, preservation and development of cultural identity. For this purpose the authorities may undertake every kind of measures including privilege to granting destination-based subsidies. By the virtue of law the advisory and consultative body to the Prime Minister was established under the name of the "Joint Commission of Government and National and Ethnic Minorities" 53 . Any issues related to the national and ethnic minority culture were excluded from the competence of the Minister of Culture and subjected to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration. Under the Department of Denominations and National and Ethnic Minorities of the Ministry of the Interior and Administration two government bodies were appointed to deal with the nation and ethnic minorities affairs. In January 2000, the National Minorities Division was installed and in January 2005, Team for Culture of National Minorities was created.
The work on elaboration of the Act on National and Ethnic Minorities and Regional Language in Poland occupied fifteen years. Poland's accession to the EU proved to be an impulse accelerating these efforts. The provisions of European law regulate the issues long since implemented concerning the displaying of minority language inscriptions and signs and the functioning of the minority mother tongues as the auxiliary languages in contacts with local authorities. According to a decree of the Minister of National Education and Sports the guarantees for the national and ethnic minority students were significantly enforced. The pupils were provided with unrestricted access to learning the language of their ancestors, and to acquire information about history, culture and geography of their native countries. The key element adjusting Poland to European legal system was the adoption of the European Race Equality Directive, which obligates its signatories to transpose anti-discriminative clauses into Polish law.
The Polish accession to the European Union (May 1, 2004) signified that Poland automatically has committed itself to observe the rules of the European legal system referring to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. According to its first paragraph all people are born free and equal in their dignity and their laws. In Europe the most important document regulating laws of national minorities is Framework Convention for 53 The Commission made up of both the representatives of the Polish Government and national and ethnic minorities was formed under the article 23 section 1 of the Act of Law dated 6 th January 2005 on national and ethnic minorities and regional language.
